The First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895): The Struggle for Korea and the Assassination of Queen Min

The First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) was one of the most consequential events in modern East Asian history, fundamentally reshaping the regional order.

At the time, Qing China was the dominant empire in Asia, with a population of more than 400 million. Japan, by contrast, was an emerging power that had only recently begun its rapid modernization through the Meiji Restoration.

At first glance, Qing China appeared to have the overwhelming advantage. Yet the outcome of the war was exactly the opposite.

Even more striking is the fact that the two powers fought much of the war not on their own territory, but on Korean soil.

Why did this happen?

This article examines the causes and course of the First Sino-Japanese War and traces its consequences through the assassination of Queen Min in 1895.

1. Why Was the War Fought in Korea?

In 1894, a massive peasant uprising broke out in Korea, fueled by anger over corrupt officials, exploitation, and the breakdown of the traditional taxation system.

This became known as the Donghak Peasant Revolution.

At the time, the Joseon government lacked sufficient military strength to suppress the peasant forces on its own.

As a result, the Korean government requested military assistance from Qing China.

However, this decision brought about an unexpected consequence.

# The Boomerang Effect of the Convention of Tientsin

Following the Gapsin Coup of 1884, Qing China and Japan signed the Convention of Tientsin.

Its key provisions were straightforward:

- Both countries would withdraw their troops from Korea.

- If either country decided to send troops to Korea in the future, it would notify the other in advance.

At the request of the Joseon government, Qing China dispatched troops to Korea and notified Japan of its decision.

Japan then seized the opportunity and quickly sent a large military force of its own to Korea.

# Japan’s Real Objective

Interestingly, the situation had already begun to stabilize after the Donghak Peasant Army reached an agreement with the Joseon government through the Jeonju Truce.

The Donghak Peasant Army demanded that both Qing China and Japan withdraw their troops from Korea.

Japan, however, refused to withdraw its forces.

Instead, Japanese troops that had landed at Incheon advanced toward Hanseong, the capital of Joseon, and in July 1894, they occupied Gyeongbokgung Palace.

Japan then established a pro-Japanese government and began to intervene directly in Korea’s domestic affairs.

At this point, a military confrontation between Qing China and Japan had become virtually unavoidable.

2. The Giant Qing Empire vs. a Japan Prepared for War

In terms of overall national power, Qing China appeared to be far stronger than Japan.

In particular, the Qing Beiyang Fleet was widely regarded as the most powerful navy in Asia.

Its modern German-built ironclad battleships, Dingyuan and Zhenyuan, posed a formidable threat to the Japanese navy.

Japan, meanwhile, had been actively reforming its military by adopting Western-style military institutions following the Meiji Restoration.

After witnessing the strength of the Qing forces during the Gapsin Coup ten years earlier, Japan became determined to strengthen its national power and significantly expand its military capabilities.

(1) Conscription

Japan introduced a nationwide conscription system that required men aged 20 and over to serve three years of compulsory military service.

This allowed Japan to move beyond its previous limited military structure and build a large, modern standing army, greatly expanding the size of its armed forces.

(2) Expansion of Naval Power

At the time of the Gapsin Coup in 1884, Qing China held an overwhelming advantage over Japan in naval strength, with the balance estimated at roughly 2.5:1 to 3:1 in China’s favor.

Over the following decade, however, Japan pursued an extensive military buildup.

As a result, by the eve of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894, the total displacement of Qing China’s navy stood at approximately 40,000–50,000 tons, while Japan’s had reached around 60,000 tons.

Japan had not only caught up with Qing China in overall naval strength but had actually gained the advantage.

(3) Introduction of a Constitutional Monarchy

With the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889 and the establishment of the Imperial Diet in 1890, Japan became the first country in East Asia to introduce a constitutional monarchy.

Japan Westernized its political system itself, guided by the Bunmei Kaika (“Civilization and Enlightenment”) movement and the belief that adopting Western technology also required reforms to the institutions and laws needed to support it.

As the political system became more Westernized, Japan also developed the institutions and military doctrines necessary to make effective use of Western science, technology, and weaponry.

In particular, the institutionalization of government budgeting and legislation enabled the state to allocate financial resources to military expansion in a more systematic and long-term manner.

The dramatic reversal in the balance of naval power over the preceding decade was made possible in large part by this institutional foundation.

At the same time, reforms to the traditional status system and the introduction of conscription helped establish a modern standing army. Japan did not simply import Western weapons; it adopted British naval practices and German military doctrine at the institutional level.

Through these reforms, Japan systematically trained professional officers, standardized military education, and successfully modernized its tactics and command structure.

(4) Securing a Diplomatic Ally

Britain, the world’s leading naval power at the time, increasingly viewed Japan as an important strategic partner in East Asia for checking Russia’s southward expansion.

Against this international backdrop, Japan cultivated close relations with Britain and secured a more favorable diplomatic position.

Although the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not formally concluded until 1902, after the First Sino-Japanese War, Britain had viewed Japan’s modernization favorably since the late nineteenth century and provided direct and indirect support in economic and military fields.

This became an important factor that helped Japan rapidly adopt Western technology and institutions and expand its influence in the international arena.

On the surface, Qing China appeared overwhelmingly powerful. In terms of actual military effectiveness, however, the reality was very different.

3. Japan’s String of Victories

# Battle of Pungdo

On July 25, 1894, the Japanese navy launched a surprise attack on Qing Chinese naval forces near Pungdo, off Asan Bay in Korea’s Chungcheong Province.

Although the battle took place before the formal declarations of war on August 1, it is generally regarded as the opening clash of the First Sino-Japanese War.

At the time, Qing China had dispatched warships and transports to reinforce its troops stationed at Asan. Japan, however, had already organized its Combined Fleet and was seeking to secure control of the Yellow Sea. Japanese warships intercepted the Qing forces near Pungdo.

One of the most significant vessels involved was the British-flagged transport ship Kowshing (高陞號), which was carrying approximately 1,200 Qing reinforcements along with military supplies.

The Japanese navy demanded the ship’s surrender, but the Qing soldiers aboard refused to comply. The Japanese subsequently sank the Kowshing, resulting in the deaths of more than 800 Qing soldiers.

The greatest significance of the Battle of Pungdo was not simply the loss of several ships.

The battle effectively severed the maritime supply route to the Qing forces stationed at Asan, leaving them isolated without reinforcements or military supplies. A few days later, the Qing forces were defeated by the Japanese at the Battle of Seonghwan, allowing Japan to seize the strategic initiative on the Korean Peninsula.

# Battle of Seonghwan

On July 29, 1894, Japanese forces attacked Qing troops stationed around Seonghwan in Chungcheong Province. This was the first major land battle of the First Sino-Japanese War.

At the time, the Japanese force numbered approximately 4,000 troops, while the Qing force consisted of around 3,800 men. The Qing troops had prepared defensive positions by constructing trenches and earthworks and flooding the surrounding rice fields.

However, the sinking of the Kowshing, which had been carrying Qing reinforcements, during the Battle of Pungdo several days earlier meant that the Qing forces at Asan could no longer receive additional troops and military supplies.

The Japanese used a frontal attack to draw the Qing defenders’ attention while maneuvering their main force around the defensive positions to launch a flanking attack.

The Qing defensive line eventually collapsed, and many of the troops retreated, abandoning weapons and military supplies as they withdrew.

Following their victory at the Battle of Seonghwan, Japanese forces quickly occupied Asan, while the defeated Qing troops retreated toward Pyongyang. This effectively brought Qing China’s plan for a coordinated offensive from the north and south to an end.

With Japanese troops having already occupied Gyeongbokgung Palace on July 23 and established a pro-Japanese government, the victory at Seonghwan became a decisive step toward Japan securing military dominance over the Korean Peninsula.

# Battle of Pyongyang

On September 15, 1894, Japanese forces launched a full-scale assault against the Qing army concentrated at Pyongyang. The Battle of Pyongyang was one of the largest land battles of the First Sino-Japanese War and became a crucial turning point in the struggle for control of the Korean Peninsula.

Qing China had assembled approximately 13,000–15,000 troops in Pyongyang. Many belonged to elite units associated with the Huai Army, which had been developed under Li Hongzhang, and they were equipped with modern weapons for the period, including Mauser rifles and Krupp artillery. Using the fortified city of Pyongyang as their main stronghold, the Qing forces hoped to launch a counteroffensive and regain the initiative in Korea.

The Japanese, however, deployed several columns to pressure Pyongyang from multiple directions, effectively encircling the Qing positions. While frontal attacks occupied the defenders’ attention, other Japanese units moved against their flanks and rear.

In particular, Japanese forces captured strategically important positions north of the city and subjected the Qing defenses to artillery fire, gradually breaking down their defensive lines.

After fierce fighting, the Qing forces raised white flags in the afternoon to signal their willingness to negotiate a surrender. By nightfall, however, most of the Qing troops had withdrawn from Pyongyang and retreated northward, abandoning large quantities of weapons and military supplies in the process.

The Qing army ultimately retreated across the Yalu River into Manchuria, effectively bringing Qing China’s military presence on the Korean Peninsula to an end. Japanese forces advanced toward the Yalu River with little further resistance, and the main theater of the war shifted from Korea to Manchuria and Chinese territory.

# Battle of the Yalu River

On September 17, 1894, Qing China’s Beiyang Fleet and Japan’s Combined Fleet clashed in the Yellow Sea near the mouth of the Yalu River.

The battle took place just two days after the Battle of Pyongyang and became the largest and most decisive naval engagement of the First Sino-Japanese War.

The Beiyang Fleet possessed powerful ironclad warships, including the Dingyuan and Zhenyuan, whose major strengths were their heavy armor and large-caliber guns. The Japanese Combined Fleet, by contrast, consisted mainly of relatively smaller cruisers but made effective use of superior speed, maneuverability, and quick-firing guns.

The Japanese navy employed a British-style line-ahead formation, arranging its ships in a single column and using their superior speed to concentrate fire against the flanks of the Qing fleet. Japanese warships also used medium-caliber quick-firing guns to unleash a high volume of shells in a short period of time, causing devastating fires aboard several Qing vessels.

The Beiyang Fleet, by contrast, possessed heavily armored warships equipped with powerful large-caliber guns, but their rate of fire was relatively slow, and coordination among the ships was less effective. Shortages of ammunition and insufficient gunnery training have also been cited as important weaknesses.

After fierce fighting, the Beiyang Fleet lost several warships, while many of the surviving vessels suffered heavy damage and eventually withdrew to Weihaiwei on the Shandong Peninsula.

Qing China subsequently lost effective control of the Yellow Sea, giving Japan greater freedom to transport troops and military supplies by sea.

Victory in this naval battle enabled Japan to expand its operations beyond the Korean Peninsula into Manchuria and the Liaodong Peninsula, allowing it to seize the strategic initiative in the war.

# The Liaodong Campaign

On October 10, 1894, Japanese forces constructed a pontoon bridge across the Yalu River and advanced into Manchuria.

Japanese troops captured a series of strategically important cities on the Liaodong Peninsula, and on November 21, they seized Port Arthur (Lüshun).

The Japanese army then sought to advance toward Beijing, the Qing capital. However, continued resistance by Qing forces across the Liaodong region, combined with the harsh winter conditions, made further operations increasingly difficult, and Japan ultimately abandoned an immediate advance on Beijing.

Qing China and Japan subsequently entered into negotiations to bring the war to an end.

4. Why Did Qing China Collapse So Quickly?

① Severe Corruption

One of the most serious problems facing Qing China was widespread corruption.

Empress Dowager Cixi, the most powerful political figure in the Qing court at the time, has long been criticized for allegedly diverting funds associated with naval and military expenditures toward the reconstruction and expansion of the Summer Palace.

The management of military supplies was also plagued by serious problems.

Some historical accounts even claim that certain artillery shells were found to contain sand or other ineffective material instead of proper explosive charges.

This did not apply to all Qing ammunition, and some of these stories remain debated. Nevertheless, such accounts have often been cited as symbolic of the corruption, mismanagement, and logistical weaknesses that undermined the Qing military.

② The Power of Quick-Firing Guns

The Qing navy built its fleet around large, heavily armored warships.

Japan, by contrast, made extensive use of quick-firing guns.

Qing naval guns were powerful, but their rate of fire was relatively slow.

Japanese warships, meanwhile, were able to fire a tremendous volume of shells in a short period of time, overwhelming the Qing fleet with rapid and concentrated fire.

③ An Outdated Military System

The Qing military was not fully controlled by the central government.

Many of its forces were organized and managed on a regional basis, making unified and efficient command difficult.

The Japanese military, by contrast, had developed a Western-style general staff system and a more centralized command structure.

Ultimately, these differences in military organization and command played a major role in determining the outcome of the war.

5. The Meiji Restoration vs. the Self-Strengthening Movement: Two Paths of Reform Revealed by the First Sino-Japanese War

Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese War demonstrated that the reforms of the Meiji Restoration had been more effective than Qing China’s Self-Strengthening Movement.

The Self-Strengthening Movement was based on the principle of Zhongti Xiyong (中體西用), meaning “Chinese learning as the essence, Western learning for practical application.” In other words, Qing reformers sought to preserve China’s traditional political and cultural foundations while adopting Western technology and military techniques.

Under this approach, Qing China actively introduced modern Western weapons, including warships and naval artillery. However, the political institutions and military administrative systems needed to support and operate them remained largely traditional and were plagued by corruption and inefficiency.

Moreover, despite importing large quantities of Western weaponry, Qing China failed to fully establish the doctrines, institutions, and organizational structures necessary to use these weapons effectively. A strong attachment to the traditional Sinocentric worldview also made parts of the Qing establishment reluctant to embrace Western military institutions and doctrines more comprehensively.

By around 1890, Japan had surpassed Qing China in what might be called the “software” of modern warfare—including military organization, logistics, command coordination, and tactical operations. This growing gap became an important factor in determining the outcome of the First Sino-Japanese War.

The war thus exposed the fundamental limitations of Qing China’s modernization efforts: it had acquired modern Western weapons but had failed to reform its institutions, administration, and military organization to the same extent.

(1) A Unified Command Structure Through the Imperial General Headquarters (大本營)

Japan coordinated its army and navy under a centralized wartime command structure centered on the Imperial General Headquarters.

This enabled the two services to conduct coordinated operations. Once the navy secured control of the sea, the army could be transported by ship and landed at strategically important locations.

Amphibious landings, ground offensives, and encirclement operations could therefore be carried out systematically as parts of a broader operational plan.

By contrast, the Qing military was less a fully integrated national armed force than a collection of regional military forces closely associated with powerful provincial leaders.

Even while the Beiyang Fleet, the core of Qing China’s naval strength, was engaged in fierce combat against the Japanese navy, other major naval forces, such as the Nanyang and Guangdong fleets, provided little active support.

This fragmented command structure, in which different fleets operated largely independently, significantly weakened Qing China’s ability to mobilize and concentrate its military power effectively.

(2) Establishment of Modern Logistics and Military Medical Systems

It is no exaggeration to say that warfare is ultimately a struggle over logistics.

Drawing on Western-style administrative institutions, Japan developed a system capable of continuously supplying its frontline forces with the materials they needed.

Conscription provided Japan with a large pool of military manpower, while railways and steamship networks were actively used to transport ammunition, food, uniforms, winter clothing, and other standardized military supplies to the front in a timely manner.

Japan also introduced Western-style military medical systems and devoted considerable attention to sanitation, disease prevention, and the control of infectious diseases among its troops.

Qing China, by contrast, suffered from a corrupt and inefficient logistics system, and military supplies often failed to reach frontline troops properly. Some historical accounts even claim that artillery shells filled with sand instead of gunpowder were distributed to Qing forces.

Military provisions were also frequently diverted or embezzled before reaching the troops. As a result, many soldiers suffered from hunger and cold, significantly reducing their combat effectiveness.

(3) Modern Tactics Led by Western-Trained Officers

Japan did not merely imitate Western military doctrines. It incorporated them into its military education system and systematically trained a professional officer corps capable of applying modern tactics in actual combat.

At the Battle of the Yalu River, the Japanese navy employed the British-style line-ahead formation (單縱陣) and high-speed maneuvering tactics against Qing China’s Beiyang Fleet.

The Japanese exploited the relatively limited maneuverability of the Qing fleet and maximized their firepower through the concentrated use of quick-firing guns.

At the Battle of Pyongyang, the Japanese army also made extensive use of German-influenced siege and encirclement tactics.

Japan’s ability to conduct systematic military operations based on reconnaissance and mapmaking stood in sharp contrast to that of the Qing forces. This tactical and organizational superiority became one of the Japanese military’s major advantages throughout the war.

6. The Treaty of Shimonoseki: The Collapse of the East Asian Order

In April 1895, Qing China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan.

The treaty fundamentally transformed the balance of power in East Asia.

On the eve of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894, Qing China was a vast empire that overwhelmingly surpassed Japan in terms of sheer national size and basic material resources.

In terms of population and overall economic scale, Qing China possessed national resources several times greater than those of Japan. Its population and territory were roughly ten times larger, while its economy was estimated to be around five times the size of Japan’s.

However, Qing China’s institutional and administrative “software” had failed to keep pace with the changing times. Despite its overwhelming advantages in material “hardware,” the Qing Empire was ultimately defeated by Japan and lost its long-standing position as the dominant power in East Asia.

A Rising Japan Defeats the Aging Qing Empire

# Qing China’s Renunciation of Suzerainty over Korea

Qing China recognized Korea as a fully independent and autonomous state.

However, this provision was not intended primarily to protect Korea’s independence.

Rather, it served Japan’s strategic objective of eliminating Qing China’s influence over Korea and strengthening Japan’s own dominance on the Korean Peninsula.

# Massive War Indemnity

The total indemnity Japan received from Qing China, including the additional payment for the return of the Liaodong Peninsula, amounted to approximately 360 million yen.

This was an enormous sum, equivalent to roughly four years of the Japanese government’s annual budget at the time.

Japan used these funds to dramatically expand its military capabilities and accelerate the development of heavy industry.

In particular, it increased investment in the iron and steel and shipbuilding industries, rapidly absorbing the technological advances of the Second Industrial Revolution.

These investments helped Japan move beyond its dependence on imported foreign warships and develop the industrial and technological capacity to design and build modern warships on its own.

This enormous indemnity was also one of the factors that later helped provide Japan with the financial and industrial foundations for its victory in the Russo-Japanese War.

# Cession of Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula

Qing China ceded Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan.

The Liaodong Peninsula was also ceded to Japan.

However, Russia, France, and Germany intervened in what became known as the Triple Intervention, seeking to check Japan’s rapid expansion.

Under pressure from the three European powers, Japan was ultimately forced to return the Liaodong Peninsula to Qing China.

As a result of the Triple Intervention, Japan was forced to return the Liaodong Peninsula to Qing China.

7. After the First Sino-Japanese War: Tragedy Descends on Korea

Following the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan sought to bring Korea firmly within its sphere of influence.

The Korean royal court, however, attempted to counterbalance Japan by turning to Russia.

Queen Min, later posthumously known as Empress Myeongseong, in particular sought to strengthen ties with Russia.

Japan regarded this growing Russian influence as a serious threat to its position in Korea.

8. The Eulmi Incident: The Assassination of Queen Min

In the early hours of October 8, 1895, Japanese rōnin and other armed participants, acting in an operation associated with Japanese minister Miura Gorō, entered Gyeongbokgung Palace.

They made their way toward Geoncheonggung, the royal residence where the queen was staying.

Queen Min was ultimately assassinated by the Japanese-led group.

Her body is believed to have been burned near the palace after the assassination.

This event became known as the Eulmi Incident (乙未事變).

The assassination of Korea’s queen by foreign forces within the royal palace itself sent shockwaves throughout Joseon society.

9. The Korea Royal Refuge at the Russian Legation and the Road to the Russo-Japanese War

Following the Eulmi Incident, King Gojong increasingly feared for his own safety.

Eventually, in 1896, Gojong left the royal palace and took refuge at the Russian legation in Seoul.

Japan regarded this forced withdrawal as a profound national humiliation.

This event is known as the Korea Royal Refuge at the Russian Legation (Agwan Pacheon, 俄館播遷).

Afterward, rivalry between Japan and Russia over influence in Korea intensified.

These growing tensions eventually contributed to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904.

Conclusion

The First Sino-Japanese War was far more than simply a war between Qing China and Japan.

It was a conflict that shattered the traditional East Asian order that had existed for centuries.

Qing China declined as the dominant regional power, while Japan emerged as a new great power.

And at the center of this transformation was Korea.

Even more tragically, Korea became one of the greatest victims of this struggle between rival powers.

In the years following the First Sino-Japanese War, Korea experienced a succession of crises and tragedies: the Eulmi Incident, the Korea Royal Refuge at the Russian Legation, the Russo-Japanese War, the Japan–Korea Protectorate Treaty of 1905, and ultimately Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910.

This is precisely why understanding this history remains so important.

[Bonus] The Limitations of Japan’s Political System and Its Defeat in World War II

The political system that helped Japan achieve victory in the First Sino-Japanese War also contained serious structural limitations. When Japan drafted a new constitution in the late nineteenth century, it did not simply adopt Western political institutions wholesale. Instead, it attempted to combine modern Western institutions with elements of Japan’s traditional political ideology.

While introducing a modern constitution that formally recognized certain civil rights, the Meiji Constitution also contained provisions that emphasized the supreme authority of the emperor.

Japanese political culture had long regarded the emperor as a sacred figure. As these ideas were incorporated into the constitutional order, imperial authority was further strengthened, while crucial powers of the state—including supreme command of the armed forces and the authority associated with war and peace—were vested in the emperor.

This constitutional structure later became one of the important institutional factors that facilitated Japan’s turn toward militarism. Although the emperor stood at the apex of the political system, responsibility for the exercise of power in his name was not always clearly defined within the constitutional structure.

This ambiguity ultimately created conditions in which the military could expand its political influence and pursue increasingly aggressive policies in the emperor’s name, contributing to the disastrous path that eventually led Japan into World War II and ultimately to defeat.

During the First Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese army and navy had been able to cooperate effectively under a relatively unified wartime command structure centered on the Imperial General Headquarters. By the time of the Pacific War during World War II, however, rivalry between the army and navy had become far more severe, reinforced by long-standing institutional traditions associated with the Chōshū-dominated army and the Satsuma-influenced navy.

The two services often failed to share military intelligence adequately and sometimes even developed weapons and equipment independently according to different specifications. Organizational interests increasingly took precedence over a coherent national strategy.

This institutional fragmentation became a major obstacle to Japan’s ability to adapt to a rapidly changing environment of warfare. During the interwar period, the Japanese military remained heavily influenced by doctrines and assumptions developed in earlier decades and struggled to fully adapt to some of the new realities of World War II.

Even as firepower and mechanization became increasingly important elements of modern warfare, parts of the Japanese army continued to emphasize offensive spirit and infantry assaults, a tendency that became symbolized by banzai charges.

The Japanese military also lagged behind its principal opponents in the large-scale and systematic use of technologies such as radar and advanced radio communications. It was comparatively slow to develop fully integrated systems for intelligence, command and control, and air defense.

These weaknesses stood in striking contrast to the organizational and institutional advantages that had helped Japan defeat Qing China half a century earlier.

# Why Was the Rational Warning of the U.S.-Educated Isoroku Yamamoto Ignored?

Isoroku Yamamoto had studied in the United States and later served as Japan’s naval attaché in Washington, D.C., giving him firsthand experience of America’s overwhelming industrial and economic power.

After observing American automobile factories and oil-producing regions, he became deeply concerned about the prospect of war with the United States. In essence, Yamamoto warned that Japan should avoid a prolonged war with the United States because America possessed an enormous industrial base capable of continuously producing aircraft, warships, and other military equipment.

However, the mainstream leadership of the Japanese military refused to accept these warnings. Hideki Tojo of the Japanese Army, drawing on his experience in Germany, strongly advocated the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany. He underestimated America’s industrial capacity and was convinced that Japan could achieve a diplomatic settlement through war.

The arguments they emphasized to the Japanese public were as follows.

(1) The Idea of a “Divine Nation” (神國) and the Belief That “Japan Had Never Been Defeated”

The Myth of the Divine Wind (Kamikaze)

The Japanese military actively used the historical memory of the failed Mongol-led invasions of Japan in the thirteenth century, when the invading forces were devastated by typhoons.

They promoted the belief that “Japan is a country protected by the gods” and developed the conviction that “Japan can never be defeated” into a powerful element of military ideology.

As Japan achieved successive victories in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Manchurian Incident, this belief became even stronger.

(2) The “Yamato Spirit” That Could Overcome Inferior Industrial Power

Whenever Isoroku Yamamoto presented objective data, such as American steel and oil production, to demonstrate the enormous disparity in national power between Japan and the United States, military hardliners responded by emphasizing spiritual strength.

They argued that “Americans are immersed in materialism and individualism, but Japan possesses the spiritual strength to sacrifice one’s life for the emperor.”

Scientific data and statistics were treated as defeatist arguments or ideas corrupted by Western thought.

Yamamoto himself also faced opposition and threats from military hardliners because of his cautious attitude toward war.

(3) The Dangerous Calculation—or Gamble—of “Strike First, Then Negotiate”

Ultimately, when the army-dominated government of Hideki Tojo decided to go to war, Isoroku Yamamoto had no choice but to carry out the war in his role as a naval commander.

In the process, he left the following warning:

“If we go to war, I will be able to act freely for the first six months to a year, but if the war continues for two or three years, I cannot guarantee the outcome.”

In reality, the gap was enormous not only in quantitative terms but also in technological quality. At the time, Japan was capable of imitating some advanced Western weapons to a certain extent, but a substantial technological gap still remained. Therefore, Japan had little chance of victory in a full-scale war against the United States.

Ultimately, these limitations became one of the important factors behind Japan’s defeat in World War II.

During the First Sino-Japanese War, pragmatic political leaders such as Ito Hirobumi stood at the center of national policymaking. By the time of the Pacific War, however, the Japanese military—particularly hardliners within the army—had come to dominate national policy.

The voices of foreign-educated officials and experts who had a more accurate understanding of international affairs were increasingly marginalized, while the ideology of Japan as a divine nation and an excessive emphasis on spiritual strength came to dominate national policy.

The rational warnings of those who had experienced the wider world were ultimately drowned out by fanaticism, and the price was the catastrophic defeat of the nation.

If Japan had accepted Isoroku Yamamoto’s cautious approach, sided with the Allies rather than the Axis powers, and ultimately emerged as one of the victorious powers of World War II, it is highly plausible that Japan would have risen to become the dominant power in Asia. It might subsequently have become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and even developed nuclear weapons. Under such circumstances, Korea’s independence would have been virtually impossible.