The Battles of Jinju: A Turning Point in the Imjin War — Why the First Siege Succeeded and the Second Failed

The Battle of Hansan Island, the Battle of Haengju, and the Battle of Jinju are commonly regarded as the three great victories of the Imjin War.

Among them, the First Siege of Jinju in October 1592—known in Korea as the Great Victory at Jinju (Jinju Daecheop, 晉州大捷)—was one of Joseon’s most remarkable victories during the early stages of the war. A few thousand Joseon defenders under the command of Kim Si-min successfully repelled a Japanese force numbering in the tens of thousands.

The following year, however, the Japanese returned. In June 1593, a much larger Japanese army launched another massive assault on Jinju Fortress. Although Joseon troops and volunteer militias resisted fiercely, the fortress eventually fell.

The two battles were fought at the same fortress, yet the circumstances surrounding them—and their outcomes—were dramatically different.

Why did Joseon succeed in defending Jinju Fortress in the first battle but fail in the second? This article examines the key factors behind the victory of 1592 and the defeat of 1593, as well as the broader significance of the two battles in the course of the Imjin War.

1. The Early Course of the War and the Strategic Importance of Jinju Fortress

When the Imjin War began in April 1592, Japanese forces advanced rapidly northward, capturing both Hanseong (present-day Seoul) and Pyongyang.

At sea, however, the situation was very different.

The Joseon navy under Admiral Yi Sun-sin repeatedly defeated Japanese naval forces, making it increasingly difficult for the Japanese army to maintain a secure maritime supply network along Korea’s southern coast.

At the same time, the growing activity of Korean volunteer militias (uibyeong, 義兵) in western Gyeongsang Province posed a continuing threat to Japanese positions and communications in the rear.

Advancing into Jeolla Province was therefore an important strategic objective for the Japanese. Jeolla had largely escaped the massive Japanese offensives that devastated other regions during the early stages of the war, and it possessed rich agricultural resources as well as significant military potential.

Yet one major obstacle stood in the way: Jinju Fortress (晉州城), a strategically important stronghold in western Gyeongsang Province.

As long as Jinju Fortress remained in Joseon hands, the Japanese could not securely control western Gyeongsang Province, and any attempt to advance into Jeolla Province carried considerable risks.

Jinju Fortress, therefore, was far more than a local stronghold. It occupied a strategically important position linking the defense of western Gyeongsang Province with the protection of the Honam region.

2. The Importance of Jinju Fortress in Historical Records

The Joseon government also recognized the strategic importance of Jinju Fortress.

According to an entry in the Annals of King Seonjo (Seonjo Sillok, 宣祖實錄) dated June 28, 1592, Kim Seong-il, a senior official dispatched to Gyeongsang Province, reported:

“I have remained in Jinju and taken measures to strengthen the defense of this district, thereby establishing a plan to protect Honam and the interior regions.”

Even before the First Siege of Jinju took place, the Joseon government had already recognized Kim Si-min’s accomplishments. According to the Annals of King Seonjo on July 26, the Border Defense Council (Bibyeonsa, 備邊司) praised him, stating that “judging from the reports submitted before and after, the achievements of Kim Si-min, the magistrate of Jinju, have been truly outstanding,” and recommended that he be rewarded.

This referred not to his later achievements during the famous victory at Jinju, but to the accomplishments he had already made in defending the Jinju region and responding to Japanese forces during the early months of the Imjin War.

In recognition of these achievements, the Joseon government promoted Kim Si-min from magistrate of Jinju to Moksa (牧使), the chief magistrate of Jinju.

After assuming his new position, Kim Si-min began preparing Jinju Fortress for a major Japanese assault.

He secured supplies of gunpowder, repaired and prepared firearms and artillery, including chongtong (銃筒), and organized the soldiers and civilians inside the fortress for its defense.

Finally, in the tenth lunar month of 1592, a large Japanese force surrounded Jinju Fortress, beginning the First Siege of Jinju.

Kim Si-min made effective use of the fortress’s strong defensive works and the firepower of the Joseon forces to repel repeated Japanese assaults, ultimately leading the defenders to victory in the First Siege of Jinju.

The First Siege of Jinju — The Great Victory at Jinju

3. Why Did the Japanese Army Fail to Capture Jinju Fortress?

① The Japanese Underestimated the Joseon Defenders

After the outbreak of the Imjin War, Japanese forces repeatedly overwhelmed poorly organized Joseon armies in land battles. They captured the capital, Hanseong, in only about twenty days and continued their advance northward toward Pyongyang and Hamgyong Province.

Moreover, shortly before attacking Jinju Fortress, the Japanese defeated a Joseon force led outside the fortress by Yu Sung-in, the Provincial Army Commander of Western Gyeongsang Province.

These early victories were among the factors that led the Japanese to underestimate the defensive strength of Jinju Fortress.

Relying on their numerical superiority and the firepower of their arquebuses, the Japanese expected that they could capture Jinju relatively easily. In reality, however, the fortress was far better prepared for an attack than they had anticipated.

② Limitations in Japanese Siege Warfare

The Japanese army excelled in field battles using spears, swords, and arquebuses, but attacking a strongly fortified position presented a very different challenge.

Arquebus fire alone had limited effectiveness against Joseon defenders protected by high fortress walls.

Japanese troops attempted to scale the walls using ladders and other means, but the defenders above subjected them to concentrated attacks with artillery, bows, stones, and even roof tiles.

As soon as the attackers approached the walls, they were exposed to intense defensive fire from above.

Jinju Fortress also possessed formidable natural defenses. The Nam River (Namgang, 南江) flowed along its southern side, while steep natural rock formations and cliffs along the riverbank were incorporated into the fortress defenses. These geographical advantages made Jinju far more defensible than an ordinary Joseon provincial walled town.

In other words, the combination of strong fortifications and favorable terrain greatly reduced the advantages that the Japanese normally enjoyed through numerical superiority, arquebus firepower, and close-quarters combat.

③ Support and Diversionary Operations by Volunteer Militias Outside the Fortress

The victory at Jinju was not achieved by the defenders inside the fortress alone.

Korean volunteer militias (uibyeong, 義兵), including forces led by Gwak Jae-u, continuously harassed and threatened the Japanese army from outside the fortress.

At night in particular, they lit numerous torches and created loud noises to give the impression that a large Joseon relief force was approaching, while also threatening the Japanese rear.

From the Japanese perspective, this meant that while attacking Jinju Fortress, they also had to remain alert to Joseon troops and volunteer militias operating behind their lines.

As a result, the Japanese could not concentrate all of their forces on assaulting the fortress walls and were placed under considerable psychological pressure as well.

4. Joseon Gunpowder Weapons That Helped Defend Jinju Fortress

Another important factor in the First Siege of Jinju was the Joseon army’s effective use of artillery and various gunpowder weapons.

① Hyeonja Chongtong and Chadaejeon

The Joseon defenders deployed several types of chongtong (銃筒), or gunpowder-powered cannon, along the fortress walls, including the Hyeonja Chongtong (玄字銃筒).

The Hyeonja Chongtong could fire not only iron projectiles but also relatively large, arrow-shaped projectiles known as chadaejeon (次大箭).

Fired from the elevated fortress walls against tightly packed Japanese troops approaching below, these weapons could be highly effective.

Whereas the Japanese arquebus was particularly effective at targeting individual soldiers, Joseon artillery had an advantage in striking concentrations of enemy troops and disrupting formations attempting to assault the fortress walls.

② Bigyeokjincheolloe

One of the most notable explosive weapons used by the Joseon army during the Imjin War was the Bigyeokjincheolloe (飛擊震天雷).

The Bigyeokjincheolloe was a type of time-delayed explosive bomb, filled with gunpowder and metal fragments and designed to detonate after a set period of time.

It could be launched into enemy positions using a mortar-like weapon known as a wangu (碗口). Japanese soldiers, initially unfamiliar with the weapon, sometimes approached the unexploded projectile out of curiosity, only to suffer casualties when it suddenly detonated.

③ The Combination of Fortifications and Firepower

Kim Si-min’s greatest strength lay not in the use of any single new weapon, but in his ability to effectively combine the defensive advantages of the fortress with the firepower available to his forces.

When the Japanese troops were still at a distance, the Joseon defenders attacked them with artillery and bows. As the attackers moved closer to the fortress walls, the defenders used every available means to repel them, including stones and roof tiles.

The combination of formidable fortress walls, artillery, archery, and personal firearms greatly reduced the effectiveness of the Japanese army’s numerical superiority.

5. Victory at Jinju and the Death of Kim Si-min

After fierce fighting, the Japanese army ultimately failed to capture Jinju Fortress and was forced to withdraw.

Under Kim Si-min’s leadership, the Joseon defenders and the soldiers and civilians of Jinju successfully repelled a large-scale Japanese assault.

The Jingbirok (懲毖錄, Book of Corrections) also describes how Japanese troops attempted to scale the fortress walls with ladders while the Joseon defenders fiercely resisted using artillery, stones, and other weapons.

Kim Seong-il also gave high praise to Kim Si-min for his role in the victory:

“Kim Si-min, the magistrate serving as central commander, had already earned the trust of the soldiers and the people. The defense of the fortress and the repulse of the enemy were therefore all to his credit.”

The victory, however, came at a heavy cost.

During the final stages of the battle, Kim Si-min was struck by a Japanese gunshot and seriously wounded. He died from his wounds shortly afterward.

Jinju Fortress had been successfully defended, but Joseon had lost one of its finest commanders.

Nevertheless, the Great Victory at Jinju became one of the most significant victories of the early Imjin War, helping prevent the Japanese from consolidating their control over western Gyeongsang Province and contributing greatly to the defense of Jeolla Province.

The Japanese committed 30,000 elite troops to the attack, but they were stopped by the powerful artillery of the Joseon forces, including the Hyeonja Chongtong, the Bigyeokjincheolloe, a time-delayed explosive weapon, and coordinated guerrilla attacks by volunteer militias operating outside the fortress. The Japanese suffered more than 10,000 deaths—approximately one-third of their entire force—and were forced to retreat in defeat.

Although it was a defensive battle, the fact that only about 3,800 Joseon troops defeated a massive Japanese army of 30,000 made the Battle of Jinju a devastating defeat and catastrophe for the Japanese forces.

The Second Siege of Jinju — The Japanese Return for Revenge

6. Why Did the Japanese Attack Jinju Fortress Again?

By 1593, the military situation had changed dramatically from 1592.

Ming China had entered the war, and the allied Joseon-Ming forces had recaptured Pyongyang, forcing the Japanese armies to retreat southward from northern Korea.

During this process, the Japanese mobilized a massive force and once again attacked Jinju Fortress.

A strong desire to avenge their defeat in the First Siege of Jinju also played an important role.

In the sixth lunar month of 1593, the Japanese launched a massive assault on Jinju Fortress, beginning the Second Siege of Jinju.

7. Why Did Joseon Lose the Second Siege of Jinju?

① Overwhelming Numerical Superiority

In the second battle, the Japanese mobilized a force on a scale that was incomparable to that of the First Siege of Jinju.

Although the exact figures vary depending on the historical source, the Japanese force is said to have numbered approximately 93,000 troops.

The Japanese were able to mobilize a massive force of 93,000 troops for the Second Siege of Jinju and sustain their offensive without major supply problems largely because they had established secure bases along Korea’s southern coast and were operating in close geographical proximity to Jinju.

From early 1593, the Japanese began constructing numerous wajō (倭城), or Japanese military fortresses, along Korea’s southern coast and shifted toward a strategy of prolonged warfare. Jinju was located relatively close to these coastal bases and was connected to them by both overland and water routes, including the Nam River–Nakdong River–southern coast network.

Unlike during the early stages of the war—including the First Siege of Jinju—when overstretched Japanese supply lines were vulnerable to disruption by Korean volunteer militias, the situation was very different during the Second Siege. By then, the Japanese were effectively operating in the immediate hinterland of their main bases along the southern coast, greatly reducing their logistical difficulties. This enabled them to mobilize a massive force of approximately 93,000 troops for the attack on Jinju Fortress.

By contrast, the Joseon troops and volunteer militias inside Jinju Fortress were vastly outnumbered.

Around 6,000 government troops and volunteer militia fighters, led by commanders such as Kim Cheon-il, Choe Gyeong-hoe, and Hwang Jin, defended the fortress, but the disparity in military strength was simply overwhelming.

In addition, approximately 24,000 civilians and other noncombatants were gathered inside the fortress.

As the siege continued, therefore, the defenders—already short of troops and supplies—were inevitably placed at an increasing disadvantage.

② External Support Was Difficult to Obtain

During the First Siege of Jinju, volunteer militias operating outside the fortress had supported the defenders by harassing the Japanese rear.

The situation was very different during the Second Siege.

The Japanese had concentrated such an enormous army around Jinju that attempting to attack them directly from outside the fortress was extremely dangerous.

The Ming army was also engaged in peace negotiations with the Japanese and therefore did not actively commit itself to a major relief operation.

Joseon commanders such as Gwon Yul and Gwak Jae-u were also opposed to concentrating large numbers of troops at Jinju Fortress against such an overwhelming Japanese force.

The fundamental reason why the Ming and Joseon armies found it so difficult to reinforce Jinju was the overwhelming size of the approximately 90,000-strong Japanese army. Joseon field forces numbered only in the thousands, making a large-scale relief effort difficult from the outset. The Ming army likewise faced serious logistical constraints that made it difficult to deploy tens of thousands of troops all the way to Jinju Fortress, located deep in southern Korea.

During the early stages of the Imjin War, the Ming army was suffering from serious logistical and supply problems.

As a result, the Joseon defenders at Jinju Fortress were effectively isolated and had to withstand the massive Japanese offensive largely on their own.

③ Monsoon Rains and the Collapse of the Fortress Walls

The Second Siege of Jinju took place during Korea’s summer monsoon season.

Continuous rainfall weakened both the fortress walls and the ground beneath them, and the Japanese took advantage of these conditions by concentrating their attacks on the fortifications.

Using shields and various forms of protective cover, Japanese troops advanced close to the walls and attempted to undermine and damage their foundations.

Eventually, part of the fortress wall collapsed, allowing Japanese troops to break into the fortress.

With the Japanese breach of the walls, the fierce defense of Jinju Fortress entered its final stage.

8. The Fall of Jinju Fortress and the Massacre

When the fortress wall near the East Gate (東門) collapsed, Japanese troops poured into Jinju Fortress.

Large numbers of Joseon soldiers, volunteer militia fighters, and civilians—including Kim Cheon-il and Choe Gyeong-hoe—lost their lives.

Multiple historical records also attest to the large-scale killing that took place at the hands of Japanese forces after the fall of Jinju Fortress.

Toyotomi Hideyoshi, deeply embittered by the devastating Japanese defeat in the First Siege of Jinju (the Great Victory at Jinju), ordered the second attack and issued an extreme handwritten command to his daimyō (feudal lords). The order stated:

“After capturing Jinju Fortress, kill every living thing within the fortress without exception.”

The Japanese commanders carried out this order literally.

Of the approximately 30,000 people inside Jinju Fortress, most were killed. According to the Japanese Military History: The Korean Campaign (日本戦史 朝鮮役), the Japanese army took more than 20,000 severed heads, while the number of people who drowned was said to be beyond counting. In fact, the population of the Jinju area declined so sharply after the Imjin War that its administrative divisions were eventually reorganized.

The Japanese army also suffered devastating losses. It is said that approximately 20,000 Japanese troops were killed during the siege of Jinju Fortress. The Joseon defenders made extensive use of gunpowder weapons such as the Bigyeokjincheolloe and Hyeonja Chongtong, and fought fiercely to the very end, knowing that the fall of the fortress would likely mean their deaths.

In 1594, the year after the battle, a Japanese envoy visited Joseon. A statement concerning Japanese losses was recorded in the Joseon historical source Bugyegimun (涪溪記聞):

“In the two battles fought at Jinju Fortress, the total number of our men [Japanese troops] killed amounted to 30,000.”  — Bugyegimun (涪溪記聞)

9. Nongae

The most famous figure associated with the aftermath of this battle is Nongae (論介).

According to tradition, after Jinju Fortress fell during the Second Siege of Jinju in 1593, Japanese troops held a banquet at Chokseongnu Pavilion to celebrate their victory. Nongae, disguised as a gisaeng (a female entertainer), is said to have approached the Japanese gathering and lured the Japanese warrior Keyamura Rokusuke (毛谷村六助) toward the rocky bank of the Nam River below Chokseongnu.

According to the story, Nongae embraced the Japanese warrior so that he could not escape and threw herself into the Nam River with him, sacrificing her own life.

The rock from which Nongae is traditionally believed to have leapt later became known as Uiam (義巖), or “Rock of Righteousness.”

The story of Nongae was recorded in detail not in official accounts written immediately after the war, but primarily in later historical and literary sources. In particular, her story became widely known after it appeared in Yu Mong-in’s seventeenth-century Eou Yadam (於于野談). Through subsequent local traditions and other written accounts, Nongae gradually came to be remembered as a symbol of loyalty and patriotic sacrifice.

A shrine known as Uigisa (義妓祠) was later established in Jinju to commemorate Nongae’s loyalty and sacrifice. To this day, she remains one of the most prominent figures symbolizing both the tragedy of the Second Siege of Jinju and Korean resistance during the Imjin War.

10. Date Masamune

One of the most intriguing Japanese daimyō who participated in the campaign at Jinju was Date Masamune (伊達政宗), who later laid the foundations of the Sendai Domain.

Having lost the sight in one eye, he became famous in later generations by the nickname “Dokuganryū” (独眼竜), or the “One-Eyed Dragon.”

Date Masamune (伊達政宗)

Date Masamune’s domain was located in northeastern Japan, far from Korea, and he therefore did not participate in the Imjin War from its beginning. He later crossed over to Korea with his troops under orders from Toyotomi Hideyoshi.

His territory in Ōshū in northeastern Japan (roughly present-day Miyagi Prefecture) was located exceptionally far from Korea, even compared with the domains of other Japanese daimyō who participated in the invasion. The journey to the Korean theater of war was therefore an enormous undertaking in itself.

To participate in the Imjin War, Date Masamune traveled approximately 2,000 kilometers, combining a long overland march across Japan with a sea voyage to Korea.

Seeking to impress Hideyoshi, Masamune boldly declared that his forces would supply themselves without relying on provisions from the Toyotomi government. However, moving several thousand troops over a distance of more than 1,500 kilometers placed an enormous strain on his supplies. By the time his army reached the Korean theater, its provisions were nearly exhausted.

Thus, although Masamune eventually reached Jinju after a journey of more than 2,000 kilometers, his soldiers were already severely fatigued. During the Second Siege of Jinju, his forces played a relatively passive role, remaining positioned toward the rear rather than taking the lead in the main assaults.

Masamune’s troops were particularly famous for their flamboyant clothing and military equipment.

The infantrymen (ashigaru) of Masamune’s army wore tall, pointed, golden conical helmets, some reportedly reaching nearly one meter in height. Seen from a distance, the formation was said to resemble a moving forest of golden conifers.

His soldiers wore matching armor coated in glossy black lacquer, while their sword scabbards were finished in vivid red lacquer, creating a striking contrast between black and red. Masamune’s own horse and those of his cavalry were lavishly decorated with tiger, leopard, and bear skins, while peacock feathers were also used as ornamental decorations.

The flamboyant appearance of Date Masamune’s troops is also described in Gang Hang’s (姜沆) Ganyangnok (看羊錄):

“He is sinister and ferocious by nature, and the military attire of his troops is extraordinarily splendid and unusual, dazzling the eyes of those who see them.”

— Ganyangnok (看羊錄)

It is true that after Jinju Fortress fell, a brutal massacre took place in which approximately 30,000 Joseon soldiers and civilians, as well as livestock, were slaughtered. However, the commanders who took the leading role in the massacre and participated in the competitive taking of Korean noses and ears as proof of military achievement were primarily the western Japanese and Kyushu commanders who had fought on the front lines of the siege, including commander-in-chief Ukita Hideie, as well as Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, and Shimazu Yoshihiro.

11. Historical Assessment and Significance

The First Siege of Jinju in 1592 and the Second Siege of Jinju in 1593 ended with completely opposite outcomes.

During the First Siege, the Joseon forces and local population under Kim Si-min effectively combined the defensive advantages of the fortress with artillery firepower, while coordinating with volunteer militias operating outside the walls. Together, they succeeded in repelling a numerically superior Japanese army.

The Great Victory at Jinju was particularly significant because it helped prevent the Japanese from consolidating their control over western Gyeongsang Province and contributed to the defense of Jeolla Province.

During the Second Siege, by contrast, the Japanese concentrated a vastly larger and more powerful force against Jinju, while the Joseon defenders were forced to fight in relative isolation with little prospect of substantial outside assistance.

The deaths of key commanders, the prolonged siege, and the eventual collapse of part of the fortress walls combined to bring about the fall of Jinju Fortress.

However, caution is necessary when interpreting the Second Siege of Jinju as a battle that inflicted such devastating losses on the Japanese that it decisively destroyed their ability to continue the war.

Although the Japanese lost an enormous number of elite troops in the two battles of Jinju—approximately 30,000 in total, including around 20,000 in the Second Siege alone—these losses represented only a limited blow when compared with the overall military mobilization capacity available to Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the ruler of Japan at the time.

More than 100,000 reserve troops remained available in Japan, including forces stationed around Nagoya Castle in Kyushu and elsewhere throughout the country. Hideyoshi therefore possessed an overwhelming reserve manpower base that allowed him, if necessary, to recruit and deploy tens of thousands of additional troops from Japan to replace his losses.

The Japanese army’s subsequent withdrawal to the southern coastal regions of Korea and its shift toward a prolonged defensive posture should therefore not be understood as the result of the Battle of Jinju alone. Rather, it was the product of several interconnected strategic developments across the war as a whole, including the intervention of the Ming army, the recapture of Pyongyang, the Battle of Haengju, the naval operations of the Joseon fleet, logistical difficulties, and ongoing peace negotiations.

Ultimately, the two battles of Jinju encapsulate many of the defining characteristics of the Imjin War.

In the first battle, thorough preparation, effective leadership, the combined use of fortifications and firepower, and cooperation between government troops and volunteer militias enabled the Joseon defenders to overcome an overwhelming numerical disadvantage.

The second battle, however, demonstrated that even the fiercest determination to fight to the death could not fully overcome the structural limitations imposed by an extreme disparity in military strength, isolation from outside support, the loss of key commanders, and the pressures of a prolonged siege.

Key Comparison: The First and Second Sieges of Jinju

# First Siege of Jinju (The Great Victory at Jinju)

- Date: 10th lunar month of 1592

- Joseon forces: Approximately 3,800 defenders

- Japanese forces: Around 30,000 troops

- Key commanders: Kim Si-min, Yi Gwang-ak, and other Joseon officers

- External support: Volunteer militias led by Gwak Jae-u harassed the Japanese from outside the fortress and supported the defense

- Main strategy: A well-prepared defensive battle using fortress walls, artillery, bows, and coordinated firepower

- Conditions: Relatively stable defensive situation

- Outcome: The Japanese army retreated, and Joseon achieved a decisive victory

- Major event: Kim Si-min was mortally wounded during the battle and died shortly afterward

- Historical significance: The victory helped prevent Japanese control of western Gyeongsang Province and contributed greatly to the defense of Jeolla Province.

# Second Siege of Jinju

- Date: 6th lunar month of 1593

- Joseon forces: Approximately 6,000 soldiers and volunteer militia fighters

- Japanese forces: Around 93,000 troops

- Key commanders: Hwang Jin, Kim Cheon-il, Choe Gyeong-hoe, and other Joseon leaders

- External support: No major relief operation reached the fortress, leaving the defenders largely isolated

- Main strategy: A massive, concentrated Japanese siege supported by overwhelming numerical superiority

- Conditions: Summer monsoon rains weakened the fortress while the siege continued for an extended period

- Outcome: Jinju Fortress fell after part of the walls collapsed

- Major event: Hwang Jin was killed in battle, while Kim Cheon-il and Choe Gyeong-hoe died after the fortress fell

- Historical significance: The battle became one of the largest last stands of the Imjin War, demonstrating both extraordinary resistance and the limits of defending an isolated fortress against overwhelming military superiority.

The true significance of the Great Victory at Jinju lies not simply in the fact that a small Joseon force defeated a much larger Japanese army.

The battle demonstrated that even an overwhelming numerical disadvantage could be overcome when the geographical advantages of a fortified position, Joseon’s weapons systems—including artillery—Kim Si-min’s effective leadership, cooperation between soldiers and civilians, and support from volunteer militias outside the fortress were successfully combined.

The Second Siege of Jinju the following year, by contrast, became a tragic example of just how important manpower, logistics, external support, and an effective command structure were in determining the outcome of war.

Although the two battles ended with completely different outcomes—one in victory and the other in defeat—both were crucial historical events that must be examined together in order to fully understand the Imjin War.